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Abstract 
 Private companies are generally viewed as the standard and most efficient providers of 
high-tech networked services such as broadband. When and under what conditions may other 
institutions provide these services equally effectively? In particular, what are the conditions 
under which the public provision of broadband is a viable option for communities? This paper 
provides a comparative analysis of different models of public and community-owned fiber 
broadband in North Carolina. I argue that public broadband initiatives, whether provided by a 
municipality or another community-owned agency, can serve important equity goals aimed at 
providing, supporting, and accelerating high-speed internet connections in underserved places 
where private providers are reluctant to provide adequate and affordable broadband. However, 
equity goals do not automatically presuppose that municipalities, often seen as generalists and 
notoriously under-resourced in terms of funding and staff, may efficiently and successfully 
deliver a technically sophisticated service such as broadband. This paper analyzes three case 
studies of community-owned fiber broadband networks in North Carolina to distill key lessons 
about the conditions under which public actors succeeded in efficiently providing broadband to 
their jurisdictions. I find that five significant themes cut across cases of successful public or 
community broadband in North Carolina. These include: (i) the presence of persistent local 
market failures that triggered the entry of the public sector into broadband provision in the first 
place, (ii) prior involvement in other networked services, such as electric and telephone 
services, on to which fiber broadband would be layered, (iii) the presence of skilled, technically 
adept administrators on the staff of the municipality in leadership roles, (iv) the presence and 
recognition of regional market opportunities, as well as the ability to leverage them, and (v) the 
presence of clear accountability and performance pressures, as well as measures of reciprocity 
in design, implementation, and management of the service. Results indicate that public actors 
may successfully undertake broadband initiatives when the proper conditions are present. This 
paper provides insights for future community broadband efforts, especially in smaller 
communities with limited market ranges, and offers important takeaways for policy and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
In the twenty-first century, fast and reliable internet services are critically important for 
business, commerce, trade, education, and communication of all kinds for communities 
everywhere. The term “broadband” is defined by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) as internet speed associated with at least 25 Megabits Per Second (Mbps) download and 
3 Mbps upload, but “broadband” is also generally used as shorthand for good, modern internet 
access (Trostle et al 2019). Broadband is an essential component of many aspects of modern 
life and work, and access to reliable, high-speed internet service has continued to grow for 
citizens, governments, and businesses everywhere. Functioning internet systems today are 
fundamental to the social wellbeing and economic competitiveness of businesses, communities, 
and regions (Roetter, 2013).  
With the dramatic rise in the use of the internet and its social and economic significance, 
many local governments have begun to take a greater interest in the availability of this 
infrastructure and resource to their communities. In recent years, often in response to local 
market failures of inadequate internet service from private providers, we see evidence of some 
American municipalities or communities becoming involved themselves in building and/or 
operating broadband networks (Trostle and Mitchell, 2016). This study examines when and 
under what conditions the public sector can efficiently provide broadband for the benefit of its 
community and region, and the viability of such non-private models.  
 In the last decade, the rise of community-owned broadband has also led to significant 
political pushback against public broadband models (Trostle and Mitchell, 2016). In North 
Carolina, the state legislature has sought to prohibit the public sector from involving themselves 
in broadband initiatives. Citing concerns over public interference in private markets, North 
Carolina’s government adopted strict regulations to limit municipal broadband efforts in the state 
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(Hoback 2016). The legal and political contention over community broadband in North Carolina 
has become an epicenter of a larger nationwide contest between private telecommunications 
companies and public entities. The outcomes of this debate will thus have wider national 
ramifications. 
Today, North Carolina’s regulatory environment for public involvement in broadband is 
shifting again. As high-speed internet continues to grow in importance, many of the state’s 
communities are still being left behind without quality broadband access. This “digital divide” 
frequently persists in rural communities and is increasingly associated with economic isolation. 
Without home internet, for example, unemployed people cannot apply to jobs online and are 
less likely to subsequently report having jobs (Talbot, 2016). Thus, persistent internet market 
failures and the pressing need for an essential service has bolstered support for community 
broadband across the political spectrum. A bipartisan bill in the North Carolina state legislature 
seeks to enable more public involvement in broadband, and is currently under consideration in 
committee. This bill, the FIBER NC Act, would relax restrictions to enable North Carolina 
municipalities to form public-private partnerships for supporting and accelerating fiber 
broadband services. At the national level, during the 2020 Democratic primary several leading 
Presidential candidates called for significant federal investment in broadband infrastructure via 
community-owned networks. Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) has called for “High-Speed 
Internet for All” by investing $150 billion through Green New Deal infrastructure grants and 
technical assistance for the creation and expansion of publicly-owned broadband networks. In 
North Carolina, the legal and financial landscape of community broadband continues to shift, 
and may change significantly in the near future. 
 Perhaps most significantly, recent events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic have 
powerfully demonstrated the essential need for reliable high-speed internet. During the course 
of writing this paper, the virus emerged as a global public health crisis. This ongoing and 
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devastating pandemic, which has led to the self-isolation of hundreds of millions of Americans in 
their homes, has shown that residential broadband access is a critically necessary service. At 
this moment, billions of people around the world are relying upon their residential internet 
services to perform many of life’s core activities from home: work, education, communication, 
purchasing delivered goods, and accessing resources such as telemedicine and faith-based 
services. As a result, the equity issues of home internet access have never been starker. For 
example, right now millions of students in the United States are unable to attend class or 
complete homework because they lack home internet (Dunne, 2020). If public education is a 
universal right for all Americans and a public good, then now so too is home internet. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has proven the urgency of delivering universal broadband (Dunne, 2020). 
Now more than ever, high-speed internet may be seen as critical for communities’ economic 
and social resilience in the face of current and future public health crises.  
As a result of this confluence of events, North Carolina is now poised at the cusp of a 
period where there will once again be experimentation in community broadband. In today’s high-
tech, post-pandemic world, local governments in North Carolina will increasingly seek ways to 
ensure and/or provide reliable high-speed internet for their communities. Many models of 
community broadband have proven successful across the state. It is timely and important to 
explore the successes of public broadband services to aid in the development of internet policy 
and practice. This paper examines some of the existing models of public and community 
broadband to inform future community efforts in this direction, and to offer lessons for what 
worked and under what conditions.  
1.1. Context and Research Questions 
Although the internet is often conceived of as an abstract, virtual world—in reality, the 
web of the internet is spatially manifested in many miles of physical copper and fiber cables. 
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The ability to access modern, high-speed internet is largely dependent upon the backbone 
infrastructure of cables running along connected electrical lines, pipes, and easements. These 
cables form the broadband network, which connects subscribers to a centralized internet 
service provider (ISP) offering phone, television, and internet services. In the United States, 
broadband networks are traditionally owned and operated by private Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) telecommunications companies. 
New telecommunications technologies have played an important role in the evolution of 
community broadband. The mid-2000s saw the rise of fiber-optics cables as state of the art, 
“future proof” network infrastructure for the age of the internet. Traditionally, and up until the 
2000s, broadband networks were formed by copper wire cables which offered limited 
connection speeds and bandwidths. But fiber cables, which transmit light signals, offer vastly 
greater capacities for high-speed internet connections. By the late 2000s, the costs associated 
with fiber infrastructure started to come down significantly and this vanguard infrastructure 
became more affordable. As fiber quickly became commercially viable, companies started to 
offer high-speed Fiber-To-The-Home (FTTH) services to residences and businesses. But 
despite fiber’s growth, many underserved rural communities remained with limited to no access 
to quality, affordable broadband internet (Trostle and Mitchell, 2016). Frequently, this “digital 
divide” persists in rural or suburban communities with insufficient cable infrastructure to serve 
the residents, businesses, and governments in the area. Today, it has been estimated that up to 
one third of rural Americans (42 million people) lack wired broadband at home (Perrin, 2019; 
Busby et al, 2020). 
In response to these deficits, different communities have pursued varying models and 
degrees of public sector involvement in broadband. In some cases, municipalities have 
unilaterally built broadband networks and stepped in as commercial ISPs. In other cases, 
telephone and electric cooperatives have sought to expand broadband services in rural parts of 
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North Carolina. The confluence of fiber’s growing economic and technical viability and the 
persistence of broadband market failures created an opening for public initiatives. In North 
Carolina, cities, towns, counties, and cooperatives have framed community fiber projects as 
necessary investments for the provision of an essential service. High-speed internet, these 
communities argue, is a public good. Therefore, the public sector has a role to play. What were 
the outcomes of the public sector stepping in to provide this service that had hitherto been 
provided by private telecommunication companies? What prompts this public action, when does 
the public sector step in, and what are the conditions that have fueled the success of community 
broadband efforts? 
1.2. Methodology 
 I answer the above questions through comparative analytical case studies of three 
community broadband initiatives in North Carolina. The primary case anchoring the paper is the 
story of the City of Wilson and the Greenlight Community Broadband Network. In addition, I 
examine the cases of Holly Springs and Wilkes Telephone Membership Corporation. All three 
cases represent different models of successful community broadband efforts. After detailing the 
case studies, I draw cross-cutting themes to generate insights about different factors that may 
explain their success. Critical analysis is used to distill lessons from the contexts of the cases. 
The project direction and methodology were shaped by an analytical literature review. Key 
informant interviews, policy documents, and relevant literature informed the critical analysis of 
each case. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I provide an analytical 
literature review of research on community broadband. Second 3 examines the case study of 
the City of Wilson’s Greenlight Network. Second 4 examines the public-private partnership in 
the Town of Holly Springs, and Section 5 studies the case of RiverStreet Networks, a subsidiary 
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of the Wilkes Telephone Membership Corporation cooperative. In Section 6, I offer comparative 
analysis of the cases and draw lessons for planners. Section 7 concludes with implications for 
planners, policy makers, and practitioners. 
2. Analytical Literature Review 
I organize the relevant literature in three broad categories for the purposes of this paper: 
1) The Digital Divide Debates: studies seeking to understand the state of broadband 
accessibility, 2) Economic Impacts: studies identifying and quantifying the economic effects of 
municipal broadband, 3) Planning, Policy, and Implementation: studies, analyses and 
evaluations of the development and implementation of municipal broadband networks. 
Collectively, these strands of the literature will inform the background, direction, and 
methodology of my research. In particular, the literature surrounding municipal broadband 
policy, planning, and implementation will inform the methodology for evaluating North Carolina’s 
models of municipal broadband. Some of the studies reviewed use interdisciplinary methods, 
and may fall within more than one of the categories.  
Table 2.1: The three themes in the relevant literature: 
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2.1. The Digital Divide Debates 
This body of literature focuses on defining the geographies of high-speed internet 
accessibility to identify which communities have access and which are most in need of 
additional broadband investment. Methods include quantifying the extent of broadband 
accessibility (spatial extent of infrastructure and services, consumer costs, etc.). These 
assessments could inform efforts to evaluate whether a community is suitable for municipal or 
community-owned broadband due to gaps in service and/or quality (and which communities 
stand the most to benefit).  
The current condition of nationwide broadband accessibility is not fully understood. 
There are many gaps in the available spatial information identifying broadband service areas, 
and we do not fully understand which areas are adequately serviced by broadband and which 
areas lack high-speed internet. This is largely due to problems of missing data, as the FCC and 
the U.S. National Broadband Map only collect service and coverage information at census block 
level spatial designations (Grubesic, 2012). These granular data means that if just one 
household within a census block—which can sometimes be a very large area—is served with 
broadband network services, then the entire census block is reported as serviced—clearly 
undercounting real access. (Poon, 2020). Due to this data reporting, a recent study estimated 
that the real number of Americans lacking access to broadband is around 42 million—double 
the FCC’s 2019 count of 21.3 million (Busby et al, 2020).  
Without finer scaled data, studies have been limited in their ability to research 
broadband accessibility despite clear gaps in coverage. The FCC has pledged to require and 
provide more refined data in the future (Poon, 2020). But given the urgency of this deficit of 
information, many researchers have sought to identify and quantify these gaps using spatial 
methodologies (Busby et al, 2020; Grubesic, 2012). Despite some progress, the lack of 
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geographic specific information has hampered empirical evaluation and policy analysis 
(Grubesic 2008, 2012). Ultimately, additional spatial data and research will be necessary to 
more fully understand the geographic patterns of broadband service, affordability, and access in 
the United States. 
An important subset of studies has surveyed household broadband connections on a 
national scale to quantify levels of access and show why private provision is not always enough. 
Perrin (2019) found that over one-third of rural Americans did not have a broadband internet 
connection at home. In addition, relatively high subscription pricing also affects consumers’ 
ability to access quality internet (Talbot 2016). In a study of broadband pricing for rural 
American communities, Torng (2019) found that 146 million people in the U.S. do not have 
access to a low-priced plan for residential wired broadband, and that zip codes in the bottom 
10% of population density pay up to 37% more on average for broadband than those in the top 
10% of population density. Studies have collected surveys of affordability (prices of residential 
plans) and found that community-owned networks charged less and offered consistent pricing 
as compared to private networks (Talbot et al, 2018).  
As for the consequences of the Digital Divide, grey literature and policy reports have 
analyzed the varied and emerging economic implications of the continued inaccessibility to high-
speed internet by households, businesses, and communities (Talbot, 2017). These reports 
identify and assess the effects for communities without broadband network services (Crawford, 
2018). For instance, Houngbonon and Liang (2017) found that for every 1 percent increase in 
broadband penetration, mean income rose by 0.14 percent, and that over a four year period, 
broadband adoption alone contributed towards 80 percent reductions in inequality. This income 
growth is explained by the fact that individuals used the internet to search for jobs (Crampton, 
2018). Crandall et al (2007) found that for every 1 percent in a given state’s broadband 
penetration, there was an increase of up to 0.3 percent in that state’s employment rate each 
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year. In general, these reports demonstrate the socioeconomic significance of high-speed 
internet and identify equity justifications as to why communities may seek to implement different 
models of broadband infrastructure and networks.  
2.2. Economic Impacts 
This stream of the literature has examined the economic effects of municipal broadband 
networks, as well as their financial performance, assessing both public or semi-public 
investments. The empirical quantification of economic effects, from fiscal viability studies to job 
creation estimates, provides mixed results and divergent conclusions. Notably, many studies 
have shown that the deployment and adoption of municipal broadband networks has positive 
effects on job creation, unemployment, firm creation, and entrepreneurship (Hasbi, 2019; Holt 
and Jamison, 2009; Jayakar and Park, 2013). Other studies point to the benefits and stimulating 
effects of the increased competition provided by municipal providers in telecom markets; 
empirical evidence has shown that public investment in communications network increases 
competitive communications firm-entry by up to 63% (Ford, 2007). Yet other economic studies 
have had inconclusive results and may be confounded by selection bias (Ford, 2018). Still other 
specific case studies have concluded that for some communities municipal broadband proved to 
be fiscally unsound, with ratepayers subsidizing losses (Ford, 2017). While some localities have 
had successful community-owned networks, others have failed. In these failed models, 
municipalities have sought to retroactively sell off assets, lease out to private retailers, and/or 
end telecommunication services altogether. In many of these cases, the public actors lacked 
beneficial conditions, such as market growth or market capture opportunities, or suffered from 
detrimental conditions such as significant costs and financial risks (Ford, 2016).  
Future research in this area could better evaluate other indirect economic effects which 
may be difficult to quantify, such as the effects of improving firm retention or fostering 
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innovation. While I do not seek to quantify economic impacts in my paper, these studies shed 
light on the conditions under which municipal broadband proves fiscally viable and economically 
beneficial, and when it does not.  
2.3. Policy, Planning, and Implementation 
There are a range of studies in this theme of research covering historical and 
institutional analyses of the development and implementation of municipal broadband networks. 
This body of work bears the most relevance for my research questions, as it provides 
evaluations and assessments of various municipal and community broadband models. 
Generally, these works are case studies of one or two municipalities, but some literature 
categorizes and compares different models across cases. These works also highlight 
implementation techniques and strategies used in their cases. Some studies examine the 
reasons municipalities and communities seek to create municipal and community-owned 
networks, and how municipal broadband is politically justified. On the whole, this body of 
literature strives to analyze municipal broadband in practice. 
The literature comparing different models of municipal broadband frequently examines 
international cases, and common characteristics of successful broadband policies are distilled 
(Roetter, 2013). These papers demonstrate the important aspects of various models, for 
example, Gulati and Yates (2012) employed multiple regression analysis to show that 
broadband diffusion results in different outcomes depending upon the technological 
development of countries and communities.  Other elements affecting success include the 
characteristics of public-private partnerships, public funding of broadband, effectively 
competitive markets, and the role of government intervention (Roetter, 2013). Other factors 
include the engagement of public utilities, the involvement of the private sector in joint 
infrastructure projects, the local demand for retail and wholesale services, and the institutional 
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and regulatory frameworks (Troulous and Maglaris, 2011). Overall, this literature concludes that 
the roles of government and the private sector must be complementary and the literature makes 
clear that municipal broadband is indeed highly contextual and variable.  
 Several U.S. based case studies offer lessons for public broadband initiatives. Hudson 
(2010) presents a case study of San Francisco’s municipal wireless broadband network, 
examining the reasons for its failure. Hudson concludes with lessons relevant for other 
municipal broadband initiatives, such as avoiding market entry when there is insufficient local 
demand. Some of these cases also more closely examine the organization structure of 
successful business models, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of various models. 
Davidson and Santorelli (2014) found that government-owned networks were often insufficiently 
profitable and/or lacked the consumer base to justify the public expenditures. Instead, the 
authors found, public-private partnerships represented a lower cost and more viable form of 
community-led broadband (Davidson and Santorelli 2014).  
 In addition, there are several North Carolina-specific grey literature reports and plans 
that speak to this theme. Trostle and Mitchell (2016) call for local control of broadband networks 
as a remedy for connectivity problems in the state. Meanwhile, the State Broadband Plan calls 
for public-private partnerships as the most robust and efficient business model (Connecting 
North Carolina, 2017). Collectively these studies provide valuable direction towards this 
project’s methods of researching and analyzing North Carolina’s municipal broadband 
experiences.  
In the next three sections, I turn to the three North Carolina case studies that I carried 
out: 1) The City of Wilson, 2) The Town of Holly Springs, and 3) RiverStreet Networks. Each 
case represents a unique model of successful community broadband networks.  
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3. Case 1: The City of Wilson’s Greenlight Network 
Greenlight is North Carolina’s first fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) community-owned 
broadband network. In operation since 2008, Greenlight is a broadband utility owned and 
operated by the City of Wilson. It is the outcome of over 15 years of planning and designing. 
This gigabit high-speed network was built by the City of Wilson in the late 2000s and continues 
operation as an ISP under the City’s authority. As of 2019, Greenlight is accessible to every 
home and business in the City of Wilson (population approximately 50,000) and the network 
serves more than 10,000 subscribing customers (City of Wilson, 2020). Since launching, 
Greenlight has proven profitable and its growth and deployment has expanded from the town to 
rural Wilson County (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012; Gonzalez, 2019). The network and its services 
have been widely praised by its citizens, businesses, and local officials (Moore, 2014). 
Greenlight has won several national awards and continues to draw attention in the US and 
around the world (Moore, 2014; Broadband Communities 2019). In the following sections, I 
trace the history of Greenlight, examine its origins, and analyze the conditions that contributed 
to the network’s success. I then examine the case critically to draw out themes and lessons that 
might inform other municipal broadband network initiatives. 
            The study of the Greenlight network is important for several reasons. Most plainly, 
Greenlight represents a prime example of good public performance. Its success merits attention 
as it runs counter to traditional and popular assumptions of the government as an inefficient 
service provider. Where the public sector is frequently criticized as constrained, overly 
bureaucratic, and unwieldy, the City of Wilson demonstrates that a local government can 
efficiently provide highly technical and sophisticated services in a cost-effective and inclusive 
manner. Greenlight also establishes that a local government can successfully build and operate 
a broadband network while competing with private providers. In becoming an ISP, the City of 
Wilson created additional competition within the regional internet service market. The notion of a 
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public actor generating competition within a private market also runs counter to traditional 
assumptions of the public sector’s role merely as a top-down regulator of the market and its 
private sector actors. In this sense, the case of Greenlight inverts expectations of the traditional 
roles of public and private actors. The experience of the City of Wilson in municipal broadband 
upends standard notions about local government’s hands-off role in the provision of services 
and, in doing so, sheds light on the complicated, nuanced, and important practices of local 
governments in providing modern services like broadband internet. 
            Perhaps most critically, the case of Greenlight also highlights how important it is for 
communities to have access to high quality and affordable internet service. High-speed internet 
is increasingly critical to communities for competing in the modern world, and for their economic 
vitality and well-being. Wilson undertook considerable effort and risk to build, maintain, and 
operate its network. Wilson did so because it believed that the internet is an essential service 
and a public good, and necessary for the health and integrity of its city and region (O’Boyle and 
Mitchell, 2012). It is to this story that we now turn. 
3.1. Origins: The Digital Divide in Wilson 
            The City of Wilson is a mid-sized municipality located approximately 40 miles east of 
Raleigh, North Carolina. Once known as “the World’s Greatest Tobacco Market,” the economy 
of Wilson declined through the latter half of the twentieth century with the fall of the tobacco and 
manufacturing industries (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). Today the City of Wilson has a 
population of nearly 50,000 people. Like many rural American communities, Wilson has 
struggled to transition and compete in globalized markets dominated by urban centers. And like 
other cities, Wilson has seen many of its younger citizens leave due to a lack of local 
opportunities. Today, Wilson has an older population and a higher rate of poverty than North 
Carolina as a whole, with 1 in 4 of its residents living below the poverty line (O’Boyle and 
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Mitchell, 2012). As Wilson’s downward trends continued into the twenty-first century, the city 
was looking for ways to mitigate economic decline and promote vitality. 
            To make matters worse, in the early 2000s, much of the city was network-underserved 
by incumbent private telecommunications providers. Many subscribers complained about slow-
speeds, unreliable service, and high costs for telephone and cable. Within rural Wilson County, 
other communities entirely lacked access to broadband. Wilson City staff were regularly fielding 
complaints about cable price hikes, and rain storms frequently knocked out service to a 
recreation department building (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). In this situation, the City had a 
distrustful relationship with its private telecommunications providers. City records from the 
1990s and early-2000s detail “tense relations” with the incumbent cable franchisee (later Time 
Warner Cable, now Spectrum). Council minutes from February 19th, 1998 document Time 
Warner Cable “walking out of a meeting” over franchise renewal terms. In addition, longtime 
Mayor Bruce Rose voiced frustration over the incumbent provider having removed popular 
television channels like CNN from its basic services (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
3.2. The Lead-up to Greenlight 
As a result of the perceived market failures of inadequate telecommunication services, 
Wilson’s leadership became interested in methods of gaining control over its 
telecommunications. In April 2001, the City of Wilson offered to purchase the local cable 
network from the incumbent provider, but its offer was rejected with the company responding 
that it would “rather go for a zero customer base versus sell any system” (History: The Story of 
Greenlight, 2019). The relationship between the City and Time Warner Cable (TWC) 
deteriorated further in early 2004, when the City commissioned a rate-regulation consultant to 
analyze the company’s proposed annual rate increase. The City felt that TWC’s price increase 
was too high and unfair to citizen subscribers, who had virtually no other options to access 
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cable services. However, the consultant determined that TWC’s price increase was not in 
violation of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) rules and must be approved. City 
officials lamented their inability to control cable prices and services and pointed to the 
telecommunication industry’s political power in Washington (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
            The following year, in 2005, there was another disagreement over price increases. This 
time, the City’s consultant determined that TWC’s network previous upgrade fee had violated 
FCC rules by charging basic tier customers for upgrades that were meant for its premium tier 
service. With this justification, the City then rejected the upgrade fee approval request. TWC 
responded with a legal challenge, appealing the decision to the FCC (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 
2012). Ultimately, TWC settled with the city and gave all its basic tier customers a $17 credit, 
returning an estimated $200,000 to residents (Wilson City Council Minutes, Sep 21, 2006). 
            In the first few years of the century, powerful preconditions for municipal broadband 
were emerging in Wilson. Longtime market failures of inadequate telecommunication services 
alienated citizen consumers in Wilson. When Wilson successfully intervened against TWC on 
behalf of the community, the city gained institutional confidence as well as political fuel from 
community support.     
3.3. First Steps Toward Fiber: “You can be the competition!” 
            As Wilson continued to spar with its private providers over inadequate and expensive 
services, the city leadership still remained frustrated at their lack of control over network 
services. In response, the City council commissioned a number of consultant-led feasibility 
studies examining the viability of the Wilson building and operating its own municipally-owned 
cable network. These studies were performed in 2004 and 2005 by Uptown Services, LLC and 
Action Audits, LLC. The consultants recommended that Wilson could indeed build a network, 
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but that instead of traditional cable, the City should pursue the next-generation technology of 
fiber-optic cables (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012).  
Then and today, fiber represents the future of network infrastructure technology. As the 
technology of light-transmitting fiber-optic cables emerged in the mid-2000s as a commercially 
viable infrastructure, fiber came to be known as “future-proof” because of its ability to provide 
orders of magnitude more bandwidth than traditional broadband cables. With its ability to 
accommodate nearly unlimited expansions of high-speed internet users, fiber continues to be 
seen by experts as an essential component of the future of internet connection. And so in the 
mid-2000s, Wilson’s consultants encouraged the City to adopt the emerging technology of fiber 
and create a next-generation, municipally-owned fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) network system. As 
the Action Audits consultant Catherine Rice summarized, when the City Council expressed 
frustration over their issues with the private internet service providers, and asked “is there any 
way for us to encourage competition?” her team responded, “yes, you can be the competition!” 
(Hoback, 2016). 
With the advice of its consultants, Wilson began taking incremental steps towards a 
future FTTH network. As a preliminary action, the City directed its municipally-owned electric 
utility, Wilson Utilities, to build a fiber “backbone” across the city connecting its own institutions 
and electrical substations (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). Fortunately for Wilson, its electrical 
utility had already been operating for over a 100 years. Wilson’s municipal electrical services 
were created by voter referendum in the 1890s when the technology of electricity was emerging 
as an essential part of life. At that time, Wilson was too small of a community to attract any 
private electrical providers. As a result, voters in 1890 overwhelmingly supported the issuance 
of bonds for the City to build and operate an “electrical light plant” (Electric Distribution, 2019). 
By the twenty-first century, Wilson Utilities was the fourth-largest municipal electric distribution 
system in North Carolina, serving over 100,000 people over many miles of electrical lines and 
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easements. This meant that Wilson Utilities had more than sufficient technical skills, 
administrative capacities, and budgetary resources to unilaterally string a fiber backbone along 
its existing electrical network. 
            By the end of 2005, the Wilson Utilities had successfully deployed fiber cables linking all 
of its municipal electrical substations in Wilson. Quickly afterwards, the fiber backbone was 
extended to all of Wilson’s government institutions. In this way, a fiber backbone was built 
around the entire city, and designed in such a way that it could later be scaled-up and expanded 
to handle thousands of connections to residents and businesses, if necessary (O’Boyle and 
Mitchell, 2012).  
There were no roadblocks preventing Wilson from laying fiber for its own purposes. 
Indeed, the City had powerful justifications for doing so for its own purposes, as its internal fiber 
system created high-speed connections between substations and government services. This 
internal fiber network improved the government’s connection speed and reliability. This in turn 
enhanced government efficiency and service delivery. For example, the internal fiber backbone 
enabled improved electrical utility grid monitoring. Additionally, the city pointed to fiber as critical 
for public safety as well, due to the need for reliable, high-speed connections for emergency 
response services. In an interview, Will Aycock, general manager of the Greenlight Network, 
asserted that “at its core, broadband utility supports other types of infrastructure” (Aycock, 
interview, Oct 1, 2019). 
            As Wilson Utilities was constructing its fiber backbone, it began reaching out to local 
community and business leaders about a possible FTTH network. Wilson officials publicly 
emphasized that the City was building essential internet infrastructure, not just a cable network 
for television (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). Although the business plans for a FTTH network 
called for offering television services to attract subscribers to generate revenues, Wilson officials 
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prioritized publicly framing fiber as critical for the emerging internet-reliant future of modern life 
and work. 
            Local community and business leaders were instrumental in providing support for the 
creation of a municipal fiber network. The presidents of Wilson’s two leading educational 
institutions, Barton College and Wilson Community College, both wrote public letters expressing 
their support for the initiative. Perhaps most critically, executives at BB&T Bank determinedly 
lent their support to Wilson’s efforts. BB&T is a large national bank that was founded in Wilson 
and remains a significant employer in the City. In 2006, Leon Wilson, a senior Vice President of 
BB&T, published a letter in the Wilson Daily Times enthusiastically supporting Wilson’s goal of 
building its own network. The banker emphasized that “our success would not be possible 
without infrastructure” and that “the city of Wilson has a proven track record of sound 
infrastructure investments” such as its water supply, utilities, and roads. Importantly, BB&T had 
provided underwriting for Wilson’s initial debt issue to fund the construction of its fiber 
backbone. 
Most crucially, Wilson was able to build off its existing electrical system to “layer” a new 
type of infrastructure on top of it. With over a century of experience in electrical service, most of 
the mechanisms were already in place for cable deployment, including staff administrative and 
technical skills, electrical substations, utility poles, easements, etc. For City officials at this time, 
building a fiber network represented a unique window of opportunity to provide an emerging 
technology that could help the community compete in the global economy, lure and retain 
business, and improve residents’ quality of life (Moore, 2014). 
3.4. Attempting a Public-Private Partnership 
            With its fiber backbone in place, in 2006 the City approached both incumbent cable and 
telecommunication providers and asked if they would be interested in partnering to complete a 
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modern fiber-to-the-home network. Despite past conflicts with its private providers, the City 
attempted to pursue a public-private partnership while simultaneously laying its own backup 
plans to independently build and operate its own network. Time Warner Cable quickly declined 
a partnership opportunity, but the City entered negotiations with Embarq (now CenturyLink). 
Wilson and Embarq came to agree on a Memorandum of Understanding, with the idea that both 
the city and the company would benefit from a shared partnership. This public-private 
partnership would be based on Wilson laying fiber infrastructure cables and Embarq handling 
the provision of telecommunications services and navigating federal regulations. But in the end, 
Embarq and Wilson could not come to a final agreement and negotiations were indefinitely 
suspended (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
3.5. Implementation 
With its initial debt service payments for its fiber backbone coming due, the City was 
under increasing pressure to “move quickly and get revenues flowing” (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 
2012). After unsuccessfully attempting to partner with private providers, Wilson determined that 
it had little choice but to independently realize its goal of the creation of a citywide high-speed 
network. In November of 2006, the Wilson City Council unanimously voted to finance the 
construction of a formal FTTH network. The city opted to finance its FTTH network using 
Certificates of Participation (COPs), a financial instrument that is similar to a revenue bond. 
COPs use the network itself as collateral—thus, no taxpayer funds were used to finance the 
network. The COPs stipulated that taxpayers would only be liable for the debt only if the 
network’s revenues ultimately proved insufficient to pay its costs. Wilson borrowed around $35 
million up front through two rounds of COP funding in 2007 and 2008 (Aycock, interview, Oct 1, 
2019). Both rounds of COPs were for a term of 15 years, with interest rates ranging from 3.25 to 
5.2 percent (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). The city’s business plan projected that their network 
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would break even within 12 years and the entire debt would be repaid within 15 years (O’Boyle 
and Mitchell, 2012). 
With the funding in place, the city moved quickly to scale-up its network. Fiber cables 
continued to be deployed throughout the city. By June 2008, video, voice, and internet 
residential services were launched under the branding of “Greenlight”. By September 2008, 
Greenlight had subscribers in over 1,000 homes (History: The Story of Greenlight, 2019). With 
its existing fiber backbone, Wilson was able to relatively easily string cables from the existing 
lines to nearby subscribers. 
Aycock explained that the first extensions of Greenlight’s network branched from the 
existing fiber backbone (built mainly along electrical lines) to those places where shorter lengths 
of cable could pick up as many customers as possible. This implementation strategy and 
business model allowed Wilson to rapidly scale-up its operations by pursuing the “low hanging 
fruit,” whereby many subscribers could be reached with minimal overhead infrastructure costs. 
With a rapid and steady influx of new subscribers and revenues, Wilson was able to confidently 
push forward with its network. In this manner, Wilson’s scaled, iterative implementation of fiber 
infrastructure fueled its rapid cable deployment, programmatic growth, and financial success. 
Moreover, Wilson gained confidence that it could indeed achieve successful, efficient municipal 
broadband services. 
As a public actor, the City emphasized its equity commitment to provide services to all of 
the city’s customers who desired broadband. City officials and Greenlight staff felt that they 
were a “community resource” with a responsibility to deliver quality services to its citizens. 
Indeed, political pressures were a constant incentive for public actors in Wilson to achieve good 
performance. As Mayor Bruce Rose put it, “I can be fired in the next election if I don’t do a good 
job here” (Hoback, 2016). The public sector pressures of democratic accountability motivated 
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Greenlight’s administrators to deliver, and to visibly demonstrate their efficiency and success. In 
addition, the fact that Greenlight was based within the community gave subscribers greater 
access to Greenlight staff. This is the so-called “strangle effect”, which creates a high level of 
organizational accountability (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
In order to build on its image as a values-driven, equity-focused provider, Greenlight’s 
prioritized determined marketing strategies as a means of gaining subscribers and fueling 
political support. Even before the network could formally offer residential services, Greenlight 
hired a sales person to visit local businesses and explain what they had planned as next steps. 
To demonstrate the power of the network, Greenlight utilized a mobile trailer with three 
computers, TVs, and a telephone to take to local events (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). The 
trailer would then be connected to the fiber network where citizens could demo-test Greenlight’s 
fast connection speeds. 
Another powerful marketing strategy Wilson used for Greenlight was to emphasize its 
“local flavor” to differentiate the network from incumbent providers (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
Greenlight has consistently touted itself as “Wilson’s Community Network” and reminded 
consumers that money spent on Greenlight stays in the community and is reinvested locally. 
With these creative and compelling marketing strategies, combined with the legacies of distrust 
and neglect that many consumers felt towards their existing private providers, Greenlight was 
able to quickly and effectively compete for subscribers. The internet market failures that had 
persisted for so long in Wilson meant the conditions were ripe for an innovative competitor to 
enter the market and win over disaffected consumers. 
            By January 2009, a year ahead of schedule, Greenlight achieved universal access for 
every home and business in the corporate limits of the City of Wilson (History: The Story of 
Greenlight, 2019). At that time, Wilson reported it had exceeded its business plan projects, 
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having signed on 1,840 subscribers, including 110 commercial-level subscriptions. By May 
2009, Greenlight had 2,700 subscribers. By March of 2010, Greenlight had over 4,600 
subscribers and continued to grow (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). 
3.6. Greenlight Services 
            With the launch of its first services in 2008, Greenlight’s connection speeds were 
immediately higher than its competitors. In addition, Greenlight’s basic tier of service was—and 
continues to be—competitively priced relative to the private provider (Svitavsky, 2016). In 2011, 
Greenlight became the first provider in North Carolina to offer residential consumers 100 Mbps 
service (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). By 2010, Greenlight had moved outside the city to serve 
Wilson County schools. And by 2011, just three years after it first offered services, Greenlight’s 
revenues exceeded its expenditures, surpassing business projections (History: The Story of 
Greenlight, 2019). In early 2012, Greenlight began providing 1 Gbps (gigabit per second) 
service to the community’s largest employer, and completed a fiber ring linking all county 
schools, lowering their costs while increasing available speed and network reliability (History: 
The Story of Greenlight, 2019)(O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). By the summer of 2012, Greenlight 
became a “Point of Presence” and a Tier 1 internet provider, creating an opportunity for Wilson 
businesses to connect at significantly lower costs. That same year, the city setup free WiFi 
hotspots around Wilson’s downtown, sports complex, airport, and library (History: The Story of 
Greenlight, 2019). 
In 2013, Greenlight upgraded its residential network to gigabit capacity, making Wilson 
North Carolina’s first “Gigabit City” (History: The Story of Greenlight, 2019). A gigabit is the 
equivalent of 1000 megabytes per second—an extremely fast connection which was being 
offered to consumers at a lower price than what some nearby communities paid for a 10 Mbps 
connection (Boyle & Mitchell 2012). By 2015, Greenlight was serving the community’s top 10 
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employers, all government institutions, as well as over 7,000 businesses and residents. In 
addition, Wilson was selected to participate in InnovateNC, a competition sponsored by NC 
State University’s Institute for Emerging Issues for sparking innovation (History: The Story of 
Greenlight, 2019). Wilson and Greenlight were honored by the then-Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, Julian Castro, for providing low-cost internet service to public housing 
residents as well as for its creative pre-pay subscription plan (History: The Story of Greenlight, 
2019). The Greenlight network had reached maturity and was well on its way to success. 
3.7. Roadblocks 
            In the summer of 2011, North Carolina’s Republican-controlled state legislature 
successfully passed bill H129. This new law sought to curtail local government’s abilities to 
become involved in network infrastructure and to compete with private providers. Large private 
telecommunications providers, such as TWC and AT&T, backed the legislature’s efforts to stop 
municipal broadband in North Carolina (Mitchell, 2011). H129 inhibited the ability of 
municipalities to fund and own broadband infrastructure. H129 allowed the existing Greenlight 
Community Broadband to continue operating, but with limitations. The new law stipulated that 
Wilson’s Greenlight service area could not extend beyond the Wilson County Line, despite the 
fact that Wilson’s electrical service area reaches into six surrounding counties (Trostle and 
Mitchell, 2016; Hoback, 2016). 
            Wilson officials were frustrated by the legislature’s preclusion of Greenlight entering new 
markets. Wilson felt that it was not only being denied new customers, but also being denied the 
ability to offer an essential public good to its underserved regional neighbors. In July of 2014, 
Wilson petitioned the FCC with a request for the authority to bring fiber to its rural neighboring 
communities outside of Wilson County. These communities included Pinetops, NC and Vick 
Family Farms, who were within the city’s electrical service area and had requested fiber internet 
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service from Wilson. Seven months later, the FCC intervened nationally and preempted H129 
and a similar law in Tennessee. The Obama-administration FCC Chairman, Tom Wheeler, put it 
plainly, “if the people, through their local government, decide they don’t like the quality of service 
their getting, they ought to be able to organize through their government, and say, ‘I want 
something better, including the government building it.’” (Hoback, 2016). 
            With this federal intervention, in 2015 Wilson’s City Council approved the extension of 
Greenlight services to Pinetops and Vick Family Farms (History: The Story of Greenlight, 2019). 
By 2016, Greenlight was serving rural Pinetops with gigabit fiber connections but was then 
abruptly ordered to turn off network services when a Sixth Circuit court decision reversed the 
FCC’s preemption that enabled Greenlight’s deployment outside the county. To make matters 
worse, this court order to cease service came at the same time that Hurricane Matthew hit the 
region, rendering some Pinetops residents financially insecure or even homeless (History: The 
Story of Greenlight, 2019). 
            Rather than cut off Greenlight’s network services to Pinetops, Wilson’s officials 
“bureaucrafted” a creative solution (Joshi and McCluskey, 2018). The regulations stipulated that 
Wilson could not provide internet service outside of the City for a paid fee. To circumvent this 
order, the Wilson city council decided to provide internet service at no cost to Pinetops’ 
residents for six months. Rather than terminate Pinetops’ service when their neighbors needed 
it the most, Wilson instead chose to give Pinetops free high-speed internet. This led to the City 
of Wilson receiving the “National Leadership Award” by the Coalition for Local Internet Choice. 
In 2017, the City agreed to stop-gap legislation that authorized Greenlight to continue providing 
service to Pinetops until a private sector provider could offer FTTH connections.  
By 2018, a private provider had set up in Pinetops, but rather than disconnect 
Greenlight, Wilson made another creative move. Instead of “turning off” its fiber network 
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indefinitely, the City decided to sell its Pinetops fiber network to a third-party private provider, 
National Lightnet (History: The Story of Greenlight, 2019). This led to the unusual situation of 
Pinetops, a small rural village, suddenly having access to two different private fiber subscription 
services. Greenlight’s entry into a rural internet service market generated competition such that 
Pinetops’ internet access and quality rapidly and dramatically improved. This once-forgotten 
hamlet went from one exclusive private provider (offering low-connection speeds) to two high-
speed fiber subscription options in just a few short years. 
3.8. Greenlight: Growth, Successes, and Impacts 
            Greenlight’s dramatic growth has had numerous downstream impacts for Wilson. By 
2012, Greenlight had over 6,000 subscribers and a 30 percent share of the Wilson market 
(O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). Greenlight’s high speed internet was rapidly fostering economic 
development and creating spillover economic benefits. In addition, the Greenlight network 
created competition within local internet markets, which in turn universally improved providers’ 
internet quality while reducing consumer costs. The consultant Catherine Rice analyzed TWC 
rates for Wilson and surrounding communities. Rice found that TWC did not increase the rates it 
charged subscribers in Wilson in 2007 or 2008—but did increase them substantially during the 
same period (up to 40%) in the nearby Raleigh metropolitan region where it had no municipal 
competition (Rice, 2009). Rice also found that Wilson residents in 2008 were now paying less 
for TWC broadband than surrounding communities, while also enjoying a heightening of internet 
speeds that Wilson’s neighbors did not see. A separate analysis found that Greenlight’s 
competitive pressures contributed to $1 million in consumer savings each year for Wilson’s 
TWC subscribers (O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). This evidence demonstrates that Greenlight’s 
entry into the market spurred private providers to reduce consumer costs and improve service 
delivery. 
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Importantly, the counter-running market forces of competition also worked to spur 
Greenlight’s good performance. Unlike Greenlight, which for regulatory reasons necessarily 
offers set pricing for its service packages, TWC can offer discounts and free additions to new 
subscribers as incentives to attract customers. Greenlight staff documented instances of TWC 
offering consumers free premium channels, cost-free DVR rental, and significantly discounted 
rates. These “signing bonuses” by TWC often undercut Greenlight’s prices and packages. While 
this situation was disadvantageous for Greenlight’s short-term subscriptions and revenues, 
ultimately this added force of competition served to put additional pressure on Greenlight to 
provide excellent service. Thus, Greenlight’s administration was further induced to deliver 
reliable, affordable, high-speed internet as its only competitive advantage against alleged 
“predatory pricing” strategies used by TWC. 
Unsurprisingly, Greenlight has contributed significantly to economic development in 
Wilson. As Aycock emphasized, Greenlight helps “drive efficiencies” in both the public and 
private sectors. Today, nearly all of Wilson’s major employers are using Greenlight’s services. In 
addition, Wilson has seen multiple firm relocations to the City—with some relocations pursued 
precisely because of Wilson’s high-speed network. One notable example has been the film 
special effects firm Exodus FX, which relocated to Wilson from Los Angeles to lower costs, but 
also because of their business needs for greater bandwidth and reliable internet service (Moore, 
2014). There has also been significant redevelopment and investment in downtown, and 
Wilson’s corporate park continues to attract new employers. Recent investments include 
BB&T’s new downtown facility, the expansion of the Fresinius Kabi facility, and construction of 
the Neopac plant (Allem, 2019). 
It may also be reasonably surmised that Greenlight has helped mitigate or prevent 
economic losses. It is likely that some local firms and workers may have chosen to relocate 
away from Wilson if they had never gained access to quality, affordable, reliable internet 
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services. Indeed, Wilson’s industrial sector remains relatively robust compared to many formerly 
industrial cities. And as Aycock pointed out, in the last decade Wilson has been one of the few 
rural North Carolina communities in its peer group to have gained population rather than lost it 
(Aycock, interview, Oct 1, 2019). 
The City has further sought to leverage its fiber network for economic development by 
creating Gig East, a new technology hub in downtown Wilson. As a subsidiary of Greenlight, Gig 
East serves as a conference space, an incubator, and a shared co-working space. In addition, 
the Gig East Summit is an annual conference that brings together national leaders in business, 
technology, and education for discussions around innovation. Gig East also partners with RIoT 
(Raleigh Internet of Things), the Triangle-based advocacy group working towards Smart City 
efforts. By creating and operating Gig East, the city of Wilson effectively leverages its fiber 
network to market its internet services, foster innovation, and stimulate economic development. 
Wilson’s entry into the creative innovation economy for the benefit of its community offers new 
paradigms of the role of local government in stimulating economic development. 
3.9. Conditions of Success in Wilson 
            Many conditions contributed to the success of Wilson’s Greenlight network. Greenlight’s 
fiber deployment was made possible by existing infrastructure, easements, right-of-ways, as 
well as technical expertise. Most notably, Wilson’s existing municipal electrical system was 
integral to their ability to enter the internet business. With Wilson’s history of electrical services 
and other infrastructure, two themes emerge. First, Wilson's legacy of investment in large-scale 
infrastructure created the institutional confidence, administrative capacities, and public support 
necessary to undertake municipal broadband. Communities with a “history of providing essential 
infrastructure have tended to operate the most successful community broadband networks” 
(O’Boyle and Mitchell, 2012). In pursuing fiber, city leaders were also able to justify public 
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investment by pointing to Wilson’s successful development of a large reservoir for water supply 
and recreation.  
Secondly, both in the 19th and 21st centuries, Wilson’s relative size created windows of 
opportunity for their municipal involvement in infrastructure and service provision. In the 1890s, 
Wilson was too small to attract private electrical providers—but it was just large enough to build 
and operate its own electrical service. In the 2000s, Wilson was again not large enough to 
attract sufficient broadband investments from private providers—but the City was just large 
enough and capable enough to build and operate its own broadband network. Then and today, 
Wilson’s relative spatial size proved to be “just right” for the conditions leading to municipal 
investments. 
            As the case of Wilson also demonstrates, the sequencing of events is critical. How the 
story played out ultimately worked in Greenlight’s favor. The city attempted every available 
avenue before embarking on a unilateral mission to build municipal broadband. Wilson tried 
again and again to work with private providers, and so when these efforts failed, the City had 
strong political and legal arguments to justify public sector involvement. At that time, conditions 
were ripe for market entry. Fiber was emerging as the new technology of internet connection. 
Furthermore, in the mid-2000s there were little to no regulatory constraints preventing Wilson 
from pursuing municipal broadband. And with private providers having created so much ill-will in 
the community, Greenlight was quickly able to sign-on disaffected customers. Furthermore, the 
internet market failures also induced the bureaucratic and technocratic leadership of Wilson to 
consistently and publicly support Wilson’s efforts in municipal broadband. This broad base of 
political and institutional support catalyzed into public action when the opportunity for fiber 
became practically viable. Ironically, after being neglected and overlooked by service providers 
for so long, Wilson became the epicenter of a larger state and national political battle over 
municipal broadband. This “David and Goliath” dynamic of Wilson versus the telecom lobby 
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proved to be a powerful political fuel for city officials to proceed with municipal broadband efforts 
knowing they enjoyed broad local support from the community. 
            Throughout Greenlight’s evolution, various pressures worked to enhance performance 
and service delivery. Intrinsically, Greenlight staff members and street-level bureaucrats were 
induced to high levels of performance because they were accountable to the community through 
the democratic process. Additionally, Wilson was able to deliver fiber in a way that not only 
provided excellent internet services to Greenlight subscribers, but in such a manner that it also 
generated competition within the market. Furthermore, the pressures of competition within the 
internet service market “went both ways” and universally improved Wilson’s internet access, 
speed, and affordability. Wilson’s inverted role as a co-competitor amongst a market of private 
firms inverts the traditional role of the public sector as a regulatory overseer of markets. In this 
case, Wilson was able to achieve quality internet for its citizens through market forces instead of 
top-down regulation. 
            With its tobacco and agricultural heritage, Wilson also benefited from a legacy of urban-
rural cooperation with its neighbors. This informed Wilson’s efforts to provide high-speed 
internet in Pinetops, a tremendously successful political move for the City. For Greenlight, these 
rural areas also represented regional market opportunities. Where demand for high-speed 
internet was unmet in Wilson County, Greenlight could effectively target customers and increase 
revenues. Today, Aycock sees Wilson as a “focal point for micropolitan smart city efforts” that is 
part of the larger “North Carolina technology and innovation ecosystem” (Allan 2019). He 
advocates for regional cooperation with the Research Triangle and the entire state for shared 
prosperity. Thus, Greenlight emphasizes local and regional economic cooperation and 
development at multiple levels. In Pinetops, the City of Wilson saw that extending Greenlight to 
its rural neighbor—even, for a time, at no cost—was a worthwhile investment because it would 
ultimately lead to a stronger regional community and economy. “None of these 
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accomplishments are because of Greenlight specifically,” Aycock said, “but rather [because] 
Greenlight is a part of a team both within the City and across the broader community that all 
work together to build our future” (Allem, 2019). 
3.10. Wilson: Conclusion 
            The case of Wilson’s Greenlight network is a prime example of good public 
performance. Greenlight demonstrates that, under the right conditions, a local government can 
efficiently provide modern internet services and generate economic development. Wilson’s 
success shows that even in a relatively small municipality with significant challenges and 
budgetary constraints, the public sector can responsibly involve itself in the delivery of highly 
technical services. Wilson’s case also demonstrates that cities can pursue municipal broadband 
in a way that enhances competition within private markets. Greenlight’s success upends popular 
notions about the public sector as an inefficient service provider. 
            Furthermore, the story of Greenlight offers powerful lessons about the conditions of 
successful municipal broadband efforts. In Wilson, a variety of existing and emergent factors 
contributed to Greenlight’s successful implementation. Throughout its evolution, Greenlight 
benefitted from existing and emergent conditions. Importantly, the timing and sequencing of 
events and situations shaped favorable conditions that contributed to Greenlight’s birth and 
development. First and foremost, Greenlight was layered on to the city’s history of having 
provided electrical network services. Thus it grew from a host of historical and social legacies, 
longtime private market failures, and Wilson’s existing infrastructure. As Greenlight evolved, the 
network built upon its efficient implementation strategies and deftly adapted as new conditions 
emerged. And of course, the business model and implementation strategies pursued by Wilson 
officials helped to drive Greenlight’s efficient delivery of services and profitability. In this way, the 
35 
 
case of Greenlight may offer important lessons for other communities seeking to invest in 
broadband. 
            Greenlight also highlights how important quality internet service is for many struggling 
communities. With high-speed internet proving increasingly essential for modern work and life, 
Wilson was willing to undertake tremendous risks and costs to build and operate its own 
municipal broadband network. Despite significant obstacles, the city moved forward with 
Greenlight because it lacked other options, because it had the ability to do so, and because the 
city saw the internet as an essential service and public good. 
            Today, with H129 still essentially in place, Wilson remains one of the only wholly 
municipally-owned broadband utilities in North Carolina—giving the community a competitive 
advantage over its neighbors. Municipalities seeking to pursue broadband efforts would do well 
to learn from Wilson’s example. If and when local internet markets fail, and the proper 
conditions are present, Wilson has shown that the public sector can unilaterally step in to 
successfully provide wholly municipally-owned internet services. Now we will turn to the case of 
Holly Springs, a hybrid model of community fiber in which the Town pursued a public-private 
partnership. 
4. The Town of Holly Springs 
The Town of Holly Springs provides a different model of municipal broadband in North 
Carolina. Holly Springs successfully pursued a public-private partnership to create a fiber 
network and bring FTTH services to the community. Between 2013 and 2014, the Town of Holly 
Springs designed, engineered, and constructed its own backbone fiber network to connect 
municipal facilities. Then in 2015, the Town partnered with Ting Internet, a startup private 
telecommunications provider, to extend high-speed fiber services to residential and commercial 
customers. Holly Springs leased the excess capacity in its fiber backbone to Ting, allowing the 
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company to quickly and efficiently build a “last mile” FTTH network for subscribers. Holly 
Springs’ public-private partnership in municipal fiber broadband may be categorized as a model 
of “Private Investment, Public Facilitation” (CTC 2017). 
Holly Springs is a suburban community approximately 15 miles from downtown Raleigh 
and has seen rapid growth in population beginning in the 1990s. The town’s population 
increased from 900 in 1992 to nearly 25,000 in 2010 (Dean 2011). In 2018, the Town’s 
population was approximately 37,000 people (U.S. Census 2019). The majority of Holly Springs 
residents hold a college degree, and many residents commute to work professional jobs in the 
nearby Research Triangle (Town of Holly Springs 2019). Holly Springs enjoys a strong 
connection to major centers of commerce and creativity.  
Yet around the time when the economic recession was subsiding, the community’s 
internet infrastructure was still lagging behind. No high-speed fiber connections were available 
in the local market. When, in 2014, Google Fiber announced its intention to expand into the 
Research Triangle metro area, the company deferred on entering many suburban markets like 
Holly Springs. Instead, Google chose to focus on more urbanized and centrally-located 
communities like Morrisville and Raleigh. Officials in Holly Springs expressed frustration at 
being left out of Google Fiber’s plans (Ohnesorge, 2017). In the meantime, Holly Springs was 
still without fiber internet for homes and businesses. The Town was looking for an effective way 
to attract private investment.  
Around this time, Jeff Wilson, IT Director for the Town of Holly Springs, said that Holly 
Springs was “at a crossroads of what to do related to facility interconnectivity needs and the 
need for increased broadband speeds” (Reed 2017). The Town’s contract with Time Warner 
Cable was set to expire soon, and so the Town sought to do their “due diligence” in terms of 
looking at all providers, calculating costs, and reviewing options. During the process of 
projecting what the Town’s recurring expenses would be, town staff determined that they 
needed to “look at what some surrounding municipalities had already done,” which was to build 
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municipally-owned fiber infrastructure (Reed 2017). Officials in Holly Springs could look to the 
progress made in nearby Wilson as evidence of the viability of public investment. 
In order to understand the feasibility of municipal broadband, the Town’s IT department 
hired the infrastructure consulting firm Columbia Telecommunications Corporation (CTC) to 
provide a “very high-level” analysis of what was needed to build a network (Reed 2017). This 
preliminary analysis was then presented to the Holly Springs Town Council in 2013. The Council 
was interested in studying the topic further and approved hiring CTC to create a full business 
case and cost-benefit analysis. The consultants spent the next months studying the feasibility of 
a municipal fiber system for Holly Springs’ public facilities.  
CTC presented their report in June of 2013 and determined that the town had a strong 
case for constructing its own fiber network. The consultants found that public investment in 
municipal fiber would help the Holly Springs’ government, its schools, and public safety. CTC 
claimed that by building an advanced communications infrastructure, Holly Springs would 
further its ability to provide government services, promote economic development, and to 
ensure that local broadband infrastructure evolved to meet the community’s needs (CTC 2013).  
Central to the consultants’ recommendations were the cost-benefit findings. Municipal 
fiber was justified for the Town because it made financial sense. CTC concluded that a Town-
owned fiber infrastructure network was “the most cost-effective approach for meeting internal 
Town networking needs in the long-term” (CTC 2013). The consultants found that the Town 
would pay approximately the same or less each quarter to build and operate the fiber than to 
continue leasing services from Time Warner Cable. CTC developed a preliminary engineering 
and financial analysis of requirements for deploying a fiber optic network to connect Town 
facilities and estimated the cost of construction at $1.5 million (CTC 2013).  
Critically, the amount of money the Town spent on telecommunication provider services 
was projected to increase substantially due to bandwidth needs and bringing new facilities 
online (Town of Holly Springs, FAQ, 2019). The consultants framed a municipal fiber investment 
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as a mechanism to “mitigate the risk” that the Town’s future needs would exceed the capacity of 
services it could afford. Municipal fiber would help to reduce risk exposure to price increases, 
while offering new high-capacity connections. CTC claimed that if Holly Springs chose to 
continue leasing circuits, it would likely pay higher annual prices ad infinitum, all while being 
stuck with less-than-adequate connections. Importantly, CTC noted, Town-owned fiber could 
“be upgraded to higher capacity at no increase in recurring costs” (CTC 2017). The case for 
municipal fiber in Holly Springs was strong. 
The CTC business case report also explicitly considered that a public fiber network could 
potentially be leveraged to enable a private sector partner to serve local businesses and 
residences. The report specifically developed recommendations for incremental strategic 
investments in expanding municipal broadband infrastructure as a means of incentivizing and 
enabling the expansion of private sector broadband offerings and competition (CTC 2017). For 
example, the report’s Priority 1 and Priority 2 construction plans for initial fiber deployment 
called for building in key locations nearby target markets of the kinds of larger businesses that 
are attractive subscribers for private providers.  
The CTC report also emphasized other types of benefits from municipal fiber. The report 
frequently pointed to fiber’s benefits for public safety and emergency response efforts, echoing 
justifications from Wilson’s case. The business case report highlighted the need for network 
reliability and infrastructure redundancy in situations involving police, fire, medical, and 
emergency response public services. The report also articulated the long-term ancillary 
education and economic development benefits of high-speed fiber. Building fiber, CTC claimed, 
represented a long-term investment in “future-proof” infrastructure technology that may readily 
accommodate much higher speeds and capacities. This excess connection capacity, known as 
“dark fiber,” could then be leased on a non-discriminatory basis to competing private ISP 
providers. 
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 CTC claimed this “dark fiber” strategy was favorable because there was virtually no risk 
or cost to the Town in providing excess capacity to a private partner. The dark fiber backbone 
infrastructure could be built at a relatively low cost, and it would then help to incentivize a private 
provider to partner with the Town. A private ISP could then build its own fiber network off of the 
municipal backbone, extending its last-mile network and providing services to nearby homes 
and businesses. This new private partner could, in turn, also stimulate additional competition 
within the local broadband market where none currently existed. Incidentally, leasing dark fiber 
to a partner provider could also generate modest revenue for the Town, which could be 
reinvested in the network. CTC recommended Holly Springs make the new fiber infrastructure 
available to the private sector under predefined terms. With the business case in hand, in the 
summer of 2013 the Holly Springs Town Council unanimously approved moving forward with a 
full engineering design, RFP, and build-out. The goal of the timeline for construction was to 
complete and operate the network by the time when the Town’s TWC subscriptions were due to 
expire (Reed 2017).  
Holly Springs’ initial 13-mile network was completed in mid-2014 (Ohnesorge 2015). The 
entire network base cost approximately $1.5 million, including professional and engineering 
services (Town of Holly Springs, FAQ, 2019). To fund its fiber, the Holly Springs Town Council 
approved a 10-year loan for up to $1.5 million. The Town stated that its loan payments are 
roughly equivalent to what it was previously spending on private facility interconnection services 
(Town of Holly Springs, FAQ, 2019). However, the difference with its fiber investment is that the 
result of the payments will eventually be a wholly Town-owned fiber backbone network. 
In October of 2015, Holly Springs announced its partnership with Toronto-based Ting 
Internet. Holly Springs and Ting, an agile startup telecommunications company, were a 
compatible fit. Though long overlooked by Google Fiber, for Holly Springs there was 
nonetheless interest by a smaller telecommunications company which could deliver next-
generation broadband on a targeted basis (Hovis et al 2017). After negotiations, the Town 
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granted Ting a license to access its unused fiber and to build connected fiber lines out to homes 
and businesses (Ohnesorge 2015). Over the next few months, Ting deployed and prepared its 
own fiber infrastructure. In January of 2017, Ting held a “lighting” ceremony for the fiber and 
opened its first FTTH connections in Holly Springs. Ting continued expanding its fiber lines into 
the neighborhoods surrounding the municipal backbone. By October of 2019, Ting had 
completed its buildout in Holly Springs (Wlodarczyk 2020).  
Ting has said that existing city networks accelerate FTTH builds, and that using 
municipal backbone networks allows Ting to quickly scale its fiber deployments. The Vice 
President of Networks for Ting Internet stated that Holly Springs’ fiber backbone was highly 
attractive to Ting, because it meant that the company could easily build without the initial costs 
and delays of constructing its own network backbone “through the middle of town” (Buckley 
2017). For the historical local private providers in Holly Springs, like TWC and AT&T, ownership 
of large existing networks may have disinclined the companies from partnerships of diminished 
returns. But Jeff Wilson has claimed that for all providers, open-access dark fiber as “a way to 
accelerate the time to market and to simplify the builds in already congested rights of ways 
along our highways and streets” (Reed 2017).  
In addition to investing in fiber infrastructure, the Town government also developed 
policies and strategies designed to attract private broadband investment (Hovis et al 2017). 
Holly Springs positioned itself as a good partner by offering streamlined government processes, 
access to information and facilities, and project facilitation and support (CTC 2017)(Hovis et al 
2017). The Town’s competent and confident administration successfully demonstrated that Holly 
Springs was a worthwhile investment opportunity for a telecommunications company.  
In addition to Ting, the ongoing excess of fiber capacity in the municipal backbone still 
presents opportunities for new private providers to partner with the Town. Holly Springs is a 
neutral provider, open to anyone in the market. This is known in the broadband industry as an 
Open-Access Network (OAN). The Town pledges to offer the same leasing, level of guidance, 
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and support to other potential partners. Indeed, officials publicly encourage new providers to 
enter the market and stimulate competition (Reed 2017). There is also some evidence that 
Ting’s entry into the market has spurred legacy private competitors like CenturyLink and AT&T 
to expand their fiber networks and service offerings in Holly Springs and elsewhere in the 
Triangle (Ohnesorge 2017). 
Today, Ting offers gigabit speeds to homes and businesses across Holly Springs. Ting’s 
fiber network runs many miles throughout the town. The benefits of fiber have been seen across 
the community. Town operations (police, fire, public utilities, etc.) are more efficient and have 
reduced costs. Holly Springs also provides free wireless internet in most public gathering 
locations and is hugely popular (Reed 2017). And though it may still be early to account for 
fiber’s economic development benefits, it is clear that the Town and Ting have provided local 
businesses, schools, and citizens with a major telecommunications asset.  
Throughout the process of partnering with the Town, Ting developed a strong 
relationship with the government and the community. In 2017, the company announced it would 
be the official naming sponsor for the new Ting Park in Holly Springs. Furthermore, Ting also 
leveraged its presence in Holly Springs as a jumping-off point expansion into nearby 
communities. By 2019, Ting had entered into three nearby markets in Wake County: the towns 
of Fuquay-Varina, Rolesville and Wake Forest. Indeed, the Town of Fuquay-Varina, five miles 
from Holly Springs, pursued a similar strategy by also first investing in a municipal fiber 
backbone and then later partnering with Ting.  
Holly Springs’ close partnership with Ting is serving the community well during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. As an accountable, customer-oriented partner to a municipality, Ting has 
begun providing services above and beyond its business model in order to help Holly Springs 
residents. Ting has automatically upgraded all subscribers to gigabit speeds for 60 days, free of 
charge. In addition, Ting is offering drive-up Wi-Fi hotspots in key locations in Holly Springs. The 
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public-private partnership model induced Ting to look for ways to help in the communities they 
serve while making the safety of the community a primary concern (Moore-Crispin, 2020).  
4.1. Factors that contributed to Holly Springs’ Success 
 Several conditions contributed to the success of Holly Springs investment in municipal 
broadband. Factors of timing, sequencing, and context created an environment of favorable 
conditions for the Town’s initiative. The case of Holly Springs shares many of the same types of 
conditions that contributed to the success of the City of Wilson’s Greenlight Network. Most 
prominently, Holly Springs’ successful investment was also sparked and driven by a local 
market failure. The absence of fiber infrastructure justified and enabled the Town’s initiative. In 
both Wilson and Holly Springs, inadequate services from private providers created pressures for 
the public control of infrastructure. The timing of this market failure was also a window of 
opportunity for municipal investment. Without private options, Holly Springs was financially, 
legally and politically justified in unilaterally investing in its own fiber network, especially if this 
internal network could later be used to spur private partner investment.  
Holly Springs is a good example of a public-private partnership model of municipal 
broadband in practice in North Carolina. By virtue of their governmental organization, both 
Wilson and Holly Springs were induced to high-levels of performance. Both municipalities were 
pressured towards high levels of performance by the “strangle effect” and the inherent 
processes of democratic accountability. This meant that customers with problems could more 
easily find a local bureaucracy to (metaphorically) “strangle,” helping to improve officials’ focus 
on serving customers (Walljasper, 2014). Furthermore, both communities saw it as part of their 
responsibility to serve the public, and justified their fiber initiatives by emphasizing values and 
by using strategic framing. Like the City of Wilson, Holly Springs’ ability to frame its municipal 
broadband project in terms of other types of benefits and values, such as public safety and 
education, helped contribute to success. The two municipalities’ emphases on factors like 
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improved government services, reduced costs, security and reliability, education, and economic 
development helped to justify the investment and fuel success.  
Common themes of business models, organization, and strategy are present in Wilson 
and Holly Springs. Notably, before pursuing FTTH, both communities took an incremental first-
step by investing in backbone fiber networks for internal governmental use. Both communities 
also had the technical skills and capacities to build and manage network services. This strategic 
sequencing later enabled the rapid extensions of FTTH networks. In both cases, this backbone 
foundation served as a jumping-off point for deploying commercial fiber to homes and 
businesses. 
Regional market failures in high-speed internet near Holly Springs also meant larger 
business opportunities were present. In both Wilson and Holly Springs, the void in regional fiber 
services allowed both Greenlight and Ting to expand beyond their initial scope-limited projects 
into neighboring communities. In Wilson, Greenlight was able to quickly expand into the county 
and beyond, gaining subscribers and scaling-up operations. Holly Springs also proved 
successful because conditions were such that regional market opportunities buoyed the 
partnership with Ting and the deployment of FTTH services. Ting invested in Holly Springs in 
part because it served as a jumping-off point for their expansions into neighboring Wake County 
towns. In both cases, the availability of larger regional markets of customers created favorable 
financial and operational conditions for FTTH investments. 
Other themes echo across the cases of Wilson and Holly Springs. To explore the 
viability of municipal broadband, both Wilson and Holly Springs first sought to learn more by 
soliciting the recommendations of consultants. In addition, both municipalities benefited from a 
“champion” leader guiding an organization with the vision and technical expertise to successfully 
deliver. There is also evidence that both Holly Springs and Wilson were able to stimulate 
competition within local broadband markets, with private providers later deploying fiber and 
improving services. Indeed, both communities publicly encouraged competition. Like Wilson, 
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Holly Springs’ competition with private rivals (i.e. Google Fiber) spurred public officials to high 
levels of performance and delivery. Like Wilson, Holly Springs successfully generated a local 
FTTH market by acting as a co-competitor, not a regulator. 
Some conditions contributing to Holly Springs' success were unique as compared to 
Wilson. The foremost contrast with Holly Springs’ municipal fiber model was the relatively small 
geographic scale of the investment. The Town’s 13-mile, $1.5 million backbone deployment was 
a more compact, affordable, lower-risk investment. Holly Springs itself is a jurisdiction of about 
15 square miles, meaning infrastructure investments in the community were relatively modest in 
scope. Thus, the condition of a limited service area in a smaller geographic scope meant that 
project costs and roadblocks were limited for Holly Springs. The scale of the project made it 
financially viable, giving the Town the ability to sell the project politically.  
Furthermore, unlike Wilson, Holly Springs’ municipal fiber initiative was justified even 
without commercial FTTH services. Whereas Wilson’s fiber business model necessitated 
capturing subscribers and revenue, Holly Springs’ fiber project was viable even without FTTH. 
The Town’s municipal fiber project had its own independent reasons and benefits, such as 
saved telecommunication costs and improved municipal service delivery. Holly Springs’ fiber 
backbone made sense even if the Town proved unable to successfully attract a private partner 
like Ting. 
Finally, Holly Springs’ unique use of a public-private partnership model meant that the 
Town bypassed many of the risks and roadblocks that Wilson faced. Holly Springs’ reliance on 
Ting to deploy network infrastructure and offer FTTH services meant that the Town did not need 
to take on considerable financial or legal risks. Critically, because Holly Springs never sought to 
become a commercial ISP, it never faced the lawsuits and preemptions that Wilson battled. By 
undertaking a limited municipal fiber deployment and partnering with Ting, Holly Springs 
successfully avoided the risks and roadblocks that may arise for wholly municipally-owned and 
operated broadband projects. 
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4.2. Holly Springs Conclusion 
Holly Springs is an excellent example of a public-private partnership in municipal fiber in 
North Carolina. The Town successfully used a low-risk strategy of municipal fiber deployment to 
attract a private partner and rapidly induce high-quality FTTH services in their community. 
Simply put, the decision to invest in fiber was a practical decision for the Town of Holly Springs. 
Municipal fiber made sense for many reasons, and it was justified through a variety of frames.  
Several conditions contributed to Holly Springs’ success. Factors such as the Town’s 
timing during a period of market failure allowed for a window of opportunity in deploying fiber 
technology and enabling Ting to capture market shares. The Town’s incremental, compact 
backbone deployment was instrumental in keeping project costs down while maximizing the 
attractiveness of Holly Springs to private partner investment. Other inherent conditions 
contributed to success, such as Holly Springs’ “strangle effect” accountability structure, the 
presence of regional market opportunities, and strong leadership from technically competent 
officials.  
The case of Holly Springs is important because it upends and inverts traditional 
expectations of local government involvement. Contrary to popular notions of government as an 
inefficient service provider, Holly Springs is an example of good public performance in delivering 
an important and highly technical service. Like Wilson, Holly Springs also upends the standard 
role of government at a top-down bureaucratic regulator. Instead of seeking to control private 
companies, Holly Springs effectively served as a facilitator and competitor within local markets. 
Finally, Holly Springs has shown that a resource-limited local government can successfully 
invest in municipal fiber in a low-risk manner. In this way, Holly Springs demonstrated the 
viability of public-private partnerships for bringing about FTTH services in a community. 
The lessons drawn from Holly Springs’ experience may prove particularly relevant for the 
near-future of municipal broadband in North Carolina. The FIBER NC Act bill, currently under 
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consideration in the State General Assembly, would codify more flexible standards enabling 
municipalities across the state to invest in fiber through a public-private partnership model. The 
FIBER NC Act would create clear authority for counties and municipalities to build and lease 
broadband infrastructure, and it would also remove legal restrictions to allow for long-term 
leases. Should this bill become law, communities across North Carolina may look to Holly 
Springs’ experience as a model of public-private partnership in fiber.  
5. A Collective Model of Public Broadband: North Carolina Cooperatives 
 Some of North Carolina’s fiber networks are also being built and operated by another 
form of publicly-owned broadband: cooperatives. Many of North Carolina’s rural areas are 
served by telephone and electric cooperatives. North Carolina has 8 Telephone Membership 
Corporations (TMCs) and 26 Electric Membership Corporations (EMCs), These nonprofit 
organizations were formed in the 20th century by rural communities who were unable to access 
private services. Each cooperative has its own unique structure and organization, but all co-ops 
are based on collective ownership, with member-voters being users of its services. 
Cooperatives are primarily controlled by a board of directors that is elected by members. A co-
op’s members may inform and/or control key decisions in the organization. In the last decade, 
co-ops have been at the forefront of fiber deployment in rural, unincorporated areas in North 
Carolina. Nationally, approximately 31% of all fiber services available in rural areas are provided 
by cooperatives (Trostle et al, 2019). Co-ops are not specifically municipally-owned or operated-
-instead they represent a form of collectively-owned/community-owned broadband and operate 
for the benefit of members.  
5.1. RiverStreet Networks 
 RiverStreet Networks is a prominent example of a telephone cooperative building and 
operating FTTH networks in North Carolina. RiverStreet Networks is the broadband business of 
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Wilkes Communications, Inc., a subsidiary of Wilkes Telephone Membership Corporation 
(WTMC). WTMC is a non-profit, cooperative corporation organized under Chapter 117 of the 
NC General Statutes. WTMC has provided telecommunication services in and around Wilkes 
County, North Carolina since 1951. WTMC’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Wilkes Communications, 
Inc. (WCI), began offering competitive fiber broadband services in areas around WTMC’s 
service areas in 2005 (Call and Strickland, 2019). By 2014, Wilkes Communications had 
completed its buildout in Wilkes County (Cramer 2019). Today, the cooperative’s rebranded 
broadband business, RiverStreet Networks, serves residential and business customers in over 
27 counties across North Carolina and Virginia (Arnason, 2017).  
 Wilkes County is in the foothills of the Appalachian mountains in northwest North 
Carolina. Wilkes County is historically predominantly rural and is not in close proximity to a 
major metropolitan area. This geography created conditions such that Wilkes County, like much 
of the state, lacked utility services well into the 20th century. After World War II, about 40% of 
the homes in North Carolina lacked telephone service. Many Wilkes County veterans had been 
exposed to the telephone during the war, and returning home they emphasized the necessity of 
telephone services for the wellbeing of their communities (NC Broadband Cooperative Coalition 
2020). So in 1949, a group of local Wilkes County citizens petitioned the Central Telephone 
Company for phone service. They found themselves unsuccessful in attracting commercial 
telephone services because their dispersed community was not a profitable market for investor-
owned telephone companies. The Wilkes community continued to seek some means of 
developing telephone services. Then in 1949, Congress extended the benefits of the Rural 
Electrification Act to telephone service and authorized TMCs. With federal and state enabling 
legislation, in 1951 a group of 23 people attended a meeting officially creating the Wilkes 
Telephone Membership Corporation cooperative (Wilkes Communications, 2020).  
The cooperative’s original territory in Wilkes County was a geographic “doughnut” 
around the center of the county, where only the twin townships of Wilkesboro and North 
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Wilkesboro had access to existing private telecommunications. Outside of town, the co-op 
offered telephone services in the more isolated rural areas. This separation of service areas 
extended into the broadband-era, with private telecommunications providers like CenturyLink 
offering broadband internet within Wilkesboro, but not outside of town. 
As Wilkes County progressed into the twenty-first century, Wilkes Communications 
“started looking at places that needed broadband” and felt that there were “a lot of areas...left 
behind by some of these larger carriers” and without any clear prospect of broadband in the 
future (Gonzalez, 2016). In order to better serve and benefit their members, the co-op’s 
leadership decided to enter the broadband business. To do this, WTMC created a new wholly-
owned subsidiary company categorized as a CLEC, a competitive local exchange carrier. This 
new company, known as Wilkes Communications, allowed the co-op to formally compete with 
other carriers in broadband. Today, Wilkes Communications offers high-speed internet, digital 
television, security systems, and personal emergency response system services.  
In 2009, Wilkes Communications made the decision to improve broadband services by 
strategically deploying fiber and offering FTTH internet. This service proved to be high demand, 
and the company grew quickly. Wilkes Communications continued to build its fiber network and 
gain subscribers. Soon the network began expanding into other counties. In just a few years, 
Wilkes Communications deployed a fiber network of 355 miles serving close to 3,000 customers 
(Keinbaum, 2019). By 2015, operating well outside of Wilkes County, it rebranded its broadband 
business as RiverStreet Networks (a reference to the company’s home address). In the years 
since, RiverStreet Networks has grown tremendously and it has made its fiber network its core 
business strategy.  
In the last three years, RiverStreet’s rapid growth has led to a new stage of development 
for the organization. The company has seen a number of recent mergers and acquisitions, and 
it has expanded its fiber network across North Carolina and Virginia.  In 2018 alone, the co-op 
both acquired and merged with other companies: In the summer, WTMC acquired Peoples 
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Mutual Long Distance Company, a south-central Virginia based cooperative. This was a cash 
transaction valued at about $21 million (Hubbard, 2018). Later in the year, WTMC merged with 
TriCounty Telephone Membership Corporation, another co-op serving the eastern North 
Carolina Counties of Washington, Beaufort, and Hyde. The merger was agreed to because of 
RiverStreet’s ability and motivation to provide higher-quality services at a lower cost to its users. 
By the end of 2018 (Keinbaum, 2019), Wilkes Communications/RiverStreet Networks had 
doubled in size. RiverStreet continues to pursue other acquisitions around North Carolina and 
Virginia. These acquisitions have been spearheaded by RiverStreet’s management, who has 
pursued the mergers and acquisitions in order to be more competitive and to gain additional 
revenues. RiverStreet’s expansion efforts were, in part, to make them more competitive with 
receiving federal grants. In addition, Riverstreet has framed its expansion strategy as helping to 
efficiently provide an essential service to rural populations in need.   
As a cooperative, Wilkes Telephone Membership Corporation is member-owned. 
RiverStreet’s customers are members, but WTMC’s traditional Wilkes-based membership holds 
voting power. In 2016, there were 8800 voting members (Gonzalez, 2016). At the end of each 
fiscal year, the co-op’s profits are either paid as dividends to members or reinvested in the 
network (Keinbaum, 2019). As a cooperative, WTMC operates on a non-profit basis and 
benefits from a tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service. But formally, WTMC’s 
subsidiary company Wilkes Communications/RiverStreet operates as a for-profit enterprise. 
This unique organizational arrangement means RiverStreet Networks operates its business in a 
cooperative manner. RiverStreet, like its parent co-op, is highly focused on delivering utility 
services to its members within historically underserved rural communities. As explained by Greg 
Coltrain, Vice President Business Development for RiverSteet, the company uses the “same 
principles” as the cooperative because “it's in our DNA.” (Mitchell, 2020). 
RiverStreet is a successful model of co-op fiber broadband in North Carolina. Wilkes’ 
version of publicly-owned broadband has been able to rapidly deploy FTTH infrastructure and 
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services. In recent years, the company’s high-performing business model has fueled dramatic 
regional expansions. Today, RiverStreet Networks’ 137 employees serve tens of thousands of 
customers across North Carolina and Virginia (Mitchell, 2020).  
5.2. RiverStreet: Analysis 
 The case of RiverStreet Networks shares several themes with the story of Wilson’s 
Greenlight Network. As in Wilson, several conditions contributed to the success of RiverStreet 
Networks. In both cases, the community’s legacy of being un- or underserved created 
conditions of social, political, and economic support for public investment. Indeed, it was the 
condition of local market failure that acted as a catalyst for public utilities. In Wilson, the 
community’s inability to attract private electric services in the late 19th century led to its forming 
a municipal electric utility--the case for Wilkes County is analogous. Where conditions in these 
rural communities led to legacies of being underserved, it fostered cultures of self-reliance. In 
both places, market failures stimulated the growth of social and institutional arrangements for 
supporting public investment. 
Another theme that emerges is RiverStreet Networks’ strategic use of its nonprofit status 
to frame their efforts. RiverStreet succeeded in part because of its ability to leverage its service-
oriented, values-based approach through strategic framing. Like the City of Wilson, the 
conditions of RiverStreet’s public service organization translated into effective marketing. Both 
broadband networks were able to rapidly attract customers, and to capitalize on rural markets 
where community ties were strong (and where sometimes there was a culture of distrust with 
private providers). Indeed, by being the first service provider to offer fiber in rural markets, both 
broadband networks reinforced their presentations as effective, user-oriented service providers. 
It was precisely RiverSreet’s legacy in supporting underserved communities that prompted the 
company towards investing in fiber. Moreover, RiverStreet touts high-speed internet as an 
essential service and public good which improves the community and supports economic 
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development. RiverStreet’s cooperative organization enables it to strategically frame itself and 
its operations as equity-driven. This framing enables RiverStreet to be highly competitive, and to 
successfully serve, attract, and retain customers.  
Like Greenlight, RiverStreet also benefited from conditions of regional market 
opportunities. The absence of quality broadband in rural markets meant that both networks were 
the first to capitalize on unmet demand. The opportunity for rural regional expansion allowed 
both networks to rapidly gain customer bases and get revenues flowing. Other themes also 
echo across the cases of Wilson and RiverStreet. Both organizations were existing utility 
operators. In this way, both Wilson and WTMC had the technical expertise, the utility poles, the 
easements, the right-of-ways, etc. This condition was a powerful precursor for success in 
deploying fiber and providing internet service. Furthermore, both Wilson and RiverStreet 
benefitted from champions leading highly competent administrations. Moreover, both 
organizations succeeded, in part, because of internal and “strangle effect” accountability 
measures. Wilson’s municipal structure and RiverStreet’s voting owner-membership meant that 
network staff were induced to high levels of performance. 
Some of the conditions that contributed to RiverStreet’s success are unique to its case. 
In particular, RiverStreet’s receiving of a number of substantial grants has directly enabled the 
company’s fiscal viability and success. Because WTMC is a federally-designated rural 
cooperative, the organization is eligible for a variety of federal grants and loans (a condition that 
North Carolina’s municipalities do not share). The co-op has received several grants through the 
American Recovery Act, through the United States Department of Agriculture’s ReConnect rural 
broadband program, and through county governments. These financial resources have 
powerfully supported RiverStreet’s operations and directly enabled their success. 
WTMC’s co-op status also allowed it to pursue other unique business strategies. In 
particular, WTMC was legally able to acquire and merge with other co-ops. This business 
strategy served to open new markets, increased RiverStreet’s customer base and revenue 
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flows, and made the company more competitive for grants. In addition, WTMC’s cooperative 
status allowed it to pursue partnerships in ways that municipalities are unable to do. A 2019 law 
at the North Carolina state level enabled TMCs to lease fiber assets from Electric Membership 
Corporations (EMCs). WTMC has taken advantage of this opportunity and is actively pursuing 
partnerships with EMCs. The following section introduces Electric Membership Corporations 
and examines an EMC partnering with WTMC to deploy fiber and bring FTTH services.  
5.3. Electrical Membership Corporations 
 Electrical Membership Corporations are cooperatives that were formed to provide 
electrical services in underserved rural areas. There are 26 EMCs in North Carolina. These 
EMCs serve about 2.5 million North Carolinians in 93 of the state’s 100 counties (NC Electric 
Cooperatives, 2020). In the last decade, some EMCs have sought to provide and/or initiate 
broadband services for their members. Various EMCs have pursued different business models. 
Some EMCs have themselves successfully deployed fiber networks and currently operate 
commercial FTTH services. In the northeastern part of North Carolina, the Roanoke Electric 
Cooperative has entered the fiber internet market with its own for-profit broadband subsidiary, 
Roanoke Connect. But most of North Carolina’s EMCs have little to no experience in internet 
services. However, a recently adopted state law has changed how EMCs may involve 
themselves in initiating fiber. In May 2019, Governor Roy Cooper signed Senate Bill 310, 
“Electric Co-op Rural Broadband Services,” which makes it easier for the state’s electric 
cooperatives to leverage their fiber networks to form partnerships for providing broadband 
services in rural areas lacking high-speed internet (NC Electric 2020).The Bill made key 
statutory changes that removed hurdles to electric co-op participation in broadband deployment 
through partnerships, including the authorization of EMCs accessing federal funds, clarifying 
flexible lease terms with broadband partners, and limiting EMCs exposure to liability (NC 
Electric 2019). 
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 In 2019, North Carolina’s Electric Cooperatives (the family of organizations supporting 
the State’s 26 EMCs) announced a statewide partnership with RiverStreet Networks to enable 
the expansion of high-speed internet access to unserved and underserved rural communities 
(NC Electric 2020). This partnership, formed in light of Bill 310, executes several pilot 
demonstration projects that could become models for providing broadband services using 
electric cooperative fiber networks (NC Electric 2020).  
One EMC partnering with RiverStreet is the Piedmont Electric Membership Corporation. 
Located in north-central North Carolina, Piedmont EMC serves the rural areas of Orange, 
Alamance, Durham, Caswell, and Granville counties. Incorporated in 1939, Piedmont EMC was 
also formed because investor-owned utility companies could not profitably electrify rural 
communities. Today, Piedmont EMC serves approximately 32,000 meters (Mitchell 2020). Like 
other co-ops, Piedmont’s mission and focus is on serving its member-owners.  
Susan Cashion, Vice President of Piedmont EMC, stated that over the last several 
years, one of the foremost concerns voiced by their members has been the lack of broadband 
services. But Piedmont’s core services are electrical, and not broadband, and so the EMC was 
unsure how to effectively support broadband efforts. Piedmont’s leadership felt they needed to 
find a novel way to help their communities gain access to high-speed internet. In particular, 
Piedmont sought to “figure out how to leverage existing assets to help bridge the gap for a 
critical need” (Mitchell 2020).  
In exploring options after Bill 310’s adoption, Piedmont co-op began talks with 
RiverStreet Networks. The two co-ops’ shared principles contributed to an organizational 
attraction and cohesion, and soon a formal partnership formed. Piedmont saw in RiverStreet a 
partner who could build a last-mile fiber network and manage ISP operations. On their end, 
Piedmont co-op could support RiverStreet’s efforts by building and leasing EMC fiber assets. As 
of 2020, Piedmont EMC is currently in the process of building out its own internal fiber backbone 
network. This backbone serves two purposes. Firstly, it drives efficiency for the electric co-op. 
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Piedmont’s fiber backbone will enable improved utility monitoring and reduced operational 
costs. Secondly, Piedmont’s partnership with RiverStreet leasing the fiber backbone will support 
the rapid and efficient provision of FTTH services to their members. 
In December of 2019, Piedmont EMC officially launched its pilot program with 
RiverStreet Networks. This pilot seeks to explore how RiverStreet could most effectively deploy 
its last mile fiber network. The pilot program has sent out communications to all of the EMC’s 
members to survey levels of interest. The co-op partners will attempt to analyze the data to see 
where the most interest is. This solicitation process will help RiverStreet drive efficiencies by 
deploying FTTH where it makes the most sense first. By onboarding the maximum number of 
customers with as little cable length as possible, RiverStreet can maximize revenues while 
minimizing costs.  
Across North Carolina, electric co-ops are successfully operating their own models of 
publicly-owned fiber broadband. Some EMCs, like Roanoke, have pursued fiber strategies 
themselves. Other EMCs are now seeking to partner with TMCs and lease fiber backbone 
assets. Whatever the arrangement, cooperatives will continue to be at the forefront of fiber 
deployment in rural parts of the state. The newly authorized cooperative partnership model may 
prove to be a particularly efficient means of bringing fiber to underserved rural communities in 
North Carolina. The emerging case of RiverStreet’s pilot program with Piedmont may offer 
valuable insights and lessons about the conditions of success for cooperative fiber broadband 
partnerships. 
6. Comparative Analysis Across the Cases and Lessons for Planners 
 Comparative analysis of the case studies reveals several thematic conditions which 
contributed to successful community broadband efforts. This section identifies and examines the 
primary conditions present across the cases. The thematic conditions of success that emerged 
from across the three cases are as follows: 
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● Market Failure - The community was inadequately served by existing private internet 
providers 
● Historically Underserved - Strong local legacies of the inadequate provision of services 
and utilities 
● Strong Prior Legacy of Public Investment - Strong local legacies of investing public 
resources in the provision of public goods — e.g. in electricity, telephone, and/or water 
● Existing Utility Operator - The public actor was already involved in operating networked 
telephone or electrical services 
● Compact Geographic Scale - The deployment of fiber was spatially limited and therefore 
less costly and more feasible 
● Values & Framing - The public actors leveraged their values-based, nonprofit, service-
oriented structures to strategically frame their efforts and compete for customers 
● Consulted - Hired professional broadband consultants 
● Internal Fiber First - The public actor first pursued an internal backbone fiber network to 
support its own operations 
● Technical Skills - The public administration of broadband efforts was led by highly 
competent, technically skilled staff--often led by a champion official. 
● Stimulated Competition - There is evidence that community broadband efforts stimulated 
competition with private providers within local markets 
● Regional Market Opportunities - Larger market failures in rural areas throughout the 
region presented market opportunities for capturing customers 
● Capacity to take High Level of Financial Risk - The public actors required significant 
loans and undertook considerable financial risks 
● Accountability Performance Pressures - Community broadband actors were induced to 
high levels of performance through democratic accountability 
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● Pressure for Public Control of Infrastructure - For one or more reasons, political pressure 
for public control of infrastructure motivated public intervention 
● Grant Eligible - The receiving of federal grants buoyed community broadband operations 
● Used Partnerships - The community broadband networks partnered with other 
organizations to deliver fiber services 
Table 6.1: Conditions of Success in Cases of NC Community Broadband 
   Wilson Holly Springs Wilkes TMC 
Market Failure   
Historically 
Underserved 
  
Strong Prior Legacy 
of Public Investment 
  
Existing Utility 
Operator 
  
Compact Geographic 
Scale 
  
Values & Framing   
Consulted   
Internal Fiber First   
Technical Skills   
Stimulated 
Competition 
  
Regional Market 
Opportunities 
  
Capacity to take High 
Level of Financial 
Risk 
   
Accountability 
Performance 
Pressures 
  
Pressure for public 
control of 
infrastructure 
  
Grant Eligible   
Used Partnerships   
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In all cases, persistent local broadband market failures served as the primary driver for 
community broadband. All of the cases were rural/suburban North Carolina communities which 
suffered from a lack of access to high-speed broadband. These conditions of local market 
failures led equity-minded public agencies to step in to provide an increasingly essential service 
and public good. Furthermore, in both Wilson and WTMC, strong prior legacies of public 
investment worked in tandem to bolster community support and subscriber adoption. In addition, 
there was clear political pressure for public control of infrastructure in both Wilson and Holly 
Springs, further spurring public broadband efforts.  
Another significant theme of success for the community fiber networks was the condition 
of prior involvement in networked services. The public ownership of infrastructure, as well as the 
technical experience in network technology, greatly enabled success in both Wilson and in 
Wilkes. In both cases, the community fiber network was able to layer onto existing assets, 
operations, and administrations. Though Holly Springs did not have prior involvement in 
networked services, this theme nonetheless represents a critical condition of success. 
In all cases, highly skilled and motivated technical administrations. Public champions like 
Will Aycock in Wilson and Greg Coltrain in Wilkes led high-performing staff. These street-level 
bureaucrats were induced to high levels of performance by nature of their accountability 
pressures. All three cases revealed how democratically-controlled administrations are held 
accountable to deliver— both through the “strangle effect” and the ballot box. Furthermore, the 
cases highlight how public and cooperative officials within institutional cultures of equity and 
public service are motivated and pressured to succeed. Serving customers was inherent in each 
of their business practices. Indeed, for all of the three cases, the community fiber networks 
purposefully emphasized their values and missions to strategically frame and justify their efforts, 
and to quickly attract customers. 
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Regional market opportunities for the community fiber networks also represented a 
powerful and perhaps necessary condition of success. In all of the three cases, the condition of 
local and regional market failures represented business opportunities to capture market share. 
For both Greenlight and RiverStreet, the ability to expand into more nearby rural markets, and 
gain many more subscribers, directly supported the fiscal viability of the network. Holly Springs 
also successfully attracted a private provider partner because of its strategic market location. 
With other underserved suburban communities nearby, Holly Springs became an anchor for 
Ting’s regional expansion. A related condition of success was the presence and creation of 
competition within local-regional internet service markets, which expanded fiber service and 
reduced consumer prices in both Wilson and Holly Springs. 
Many other conditions of success were present across cases. My results point to the 
many different ways that varied community fiber network models have achieved success. These 
cases indicate that public actors may successfully provide broadband services under a variety 
of conditions. The precise elements of success are contextual, and therefore future planning 
efforts for publicly-owned broadband may learn from these different models to tailor efforts for 
their unique assets and their particular community needs.  
7. Conclusion and Implications for Planners 
 Community broadband efforts have been at the forefront of fiber deployment and internet 
services in North Carolina, though traditionally private companies have been the standard 
providers of such services (TWC, AT&T, etc.). Cases of demonstrated success point to the 
important roles that public actors may play in providing, supporting, and accelerating fiber 
networks. Where market failures exist alongside other conditions, the public sector may step in 
to efficiently provide an essential public good. Five significant themes of conditions of success 
echo across the cases. Most prominently, these include: (i) persistent local broadband market 
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failures served as the primary catalyst for publicly-owned fiber efforts, (ii) prior involvement in 
networked services, (iii) the presence of highly skilled and motivated technical administrations, 
(iv) the presence and recognition of regional market opportunities, (v) accountability measures, 
performance pressures, and reciprocal incentives.  
Other critical conditions of success may be found in themes such as conditions of local 
historical legacies of being utility-underserved—or conversely, in communities with prior 
legacies of public investment. Still more conditions were significant contributing elements of 
success, including themes such as the focus on values and framing, the use of consulting, the 
presence of local market competition, and the phased implementation of a fiber backbone.  
 Community broadband will continue to evolve in the near future. The North Carolina 
legislature remains in consideration of the FIBER NC Act, which would authorize public-private 
partnerships. At the national level, there are growing calls for federal investment in municipal 
fiber across the country. Perhaps most significantly, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown 
broadband to be an essential service and public good. It is sure that equity-focused public 
agencies will increasingly seek ways to ensure and/or provide reliable high-speed internet for 
their communities. 
 This paper informs future community broadband efforts and offers important takeaways 
and lessons for local governments seeking to invest in fiber. It has never been more important 
to understand the conditions under which these services may be provided in economically 
viable, inclusive, and efficient ways. Insights into the conditions of success enable public actors 
to make well-informed decisions about tailoring broadband efforts to their own communities and 
their own needs. Based on a community’s context, different models of community broadband 
may prove more efficient and viable for delivering fiber. In particular, public-private partnerships, 
enabled by the passage of the FIBER NC Act, may represent a flexible, low-risk business model 
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for North Carolina’s local governments to accelerate fiber services. Going forward, one thing is 
certain: community broadband networks will continue to play an important role in delivering 
high-speed fiber internet across North Carolina.  
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